Introduction
The United Nations (UN) Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism 2 has put PVE and the related concept of countering violent extremism (CVE) at the heart of the political and international development agenda. The Middle East became a major arena for prevention efforts following the proliferation of extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. Although the number of fighters from Lebanon remains small and communities tend to identify more pressing problems, such as the lack of job opportunities, donor organisations are including PVE and CVE in their funding priorities, and local, national and international organisations are taking the opportunity to reframe their work to focus on PVE in Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian communities.
Violent extremism is defined in Lebanon's new national strategy for PVE as the "spread of individual and collective hatred", "rejection of diversity", "the use of violence as a means of expression and influence", and "a behaviour that threatens societal values ensuring social stability". 3 Other definitions include the use of "ideologically motivated or justified violence to further political, economic or social objectives", 4 and the targeting of civilians to rectify grievances. 5 In the design of this research, violent extremism is understood as a phenomenon that includes support of violence and armed groups, whereby armed groups are associated View from above, Tripoli, Lebanon © Ali Hamouch/International Alert by research participants with local politically backed groups in Tripoli, and to a lesser extent with militant organisations active in Syria.
Many of the PVE projects in Lebanon have been implemented in the so-called "hotspot" areas, including Tripoli, Sidon and Majdal Anjar, which share a similar confessional make-up, recent experiences of violent clashes, 6 and a sense of political and economic marginalisation. Parallel to the implementation of various projects, the Lebanese government developed a broad national strategy for PVE, which was officially endorsed by the Council of Ministers in March 2018.
An initial mapping in 2016 of CVE and PVE projects in Lebanon by International Alert followed by discussions with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors demonstrated that most of the projects were centred on social change more broadly and promoted social stability, social cohesion, human rights, good governance or peacebuilding. PVE is often seen as an add-on objective or an assumed result of promoting values of peace, tolerance and non-violence. Furthermore, many of the projects were found to target youth, collectively seen as being vulnerable to violent extremism in the hotspot areas. 7 Across organisations and approaches, monitoring systems were found to be nascent and -with a few exceptions -there was no evidence that the interventions were contributing to prevention of violent extremism.
This research was thus designed to fill the gap in evidence of the impacts of PVE and CVE interventions in Lebanon. Although donor agencies continue to use different terms -with many adopting PVE in line with the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action and others referencing CVE in their strategic documents -following the initial mapping and collaborative research design, 8 this research narrowed its focus to PVE. This was intended to gain a broader understanding of prevention at individual, community and structural levels, and to reflect the language of Lebanon's national strategy for PVE.
9
The research aims to critically assess PVE programming and the underlying theories of change in order to inform more nuanced, effective and sustainable youth-focused programming that identifies and addresses the root causes and drivers of violent extremism in Lebanon. The specific objective is to increase critical understanding of the impact of PVE programming involving youth among policy-makers, practitioners and donors, and to inform the planning, monitoring, adaptation and evaluation of PVE interventions. 
Objectives and methodology

Conceptual framework
This research focuses on primary prevention programmes aimed at protecting communities from the risks of violent extremism. 10 Falling under the framework of resilience to violent extremism, such programmes are often concerned with resilience factors -whether social, psychological or physical -that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism. 11 The drivers of resilience indicate both what motivates people to join extremist groups and what allows individuals and groups to resist narratives around violent extremism and recruitment efforts by armed groups.
12 10 Primary prevention is aimed at healthy people and prevents them from developing a given problem, while secondary prevention is aimed at stopping progress towards a given problem among those for whom warning signs have been identified. Tertiary prevention is the "remediation of a problem for those who concretely manifest a given problem". M.J. Williams, J.G. Organisations implementing resilience-building projects in Tripoli helped to identify the priority resilience factors among youth in the city. Although some of these organisations have made progress measuring the resilience of their beneficiaries, there has been no systematic effort to monitor vulnerabilities, or to assess the interaction between the resilience built through the projects and the key vulnerabilities to violent extremism.
This research therefore sought to gather evidence on the types of resilience built through different project approaches, and the dynamic between resilience and vulnerability to violent extremism. While vulnerability and resilience do not necessarily have a binary relationship (i.e. that a deficit in one resilience area automatically increases vulnerability in a corresponding vulnerability area to the same degree, or vice versa), they do have a relationship. 13 Vulnerabilities often include a mixture of drivers at the individual, community and structural levels, which may not translate into resilience factors. The priority vulnerability factors were identified by the group of practitioners from the organisations implementing resilience-building projects in Tripoli and updated based on an initial validation process, including a literature review and KIIs.
The selection of Tripoli as the study site was driven by the established proliferation of PVE-related interventions in the city. Practitioners tend to explain this focus on Tripoli and other Sunni-majority areas with the donor understanding of violent extremism as related to militant Sunni groups, with many organisations concerned with such targeting as well as the risk of stigmatising the Sunni community in Lebanon. Furthermore, both peacebuilding practitioners and researchers have highlighted the similarities in the factors driving support for violent extremist groups and support for other political groups in Lebanon that overtly or covertly support the use of violence to achieve political goals.
14 Based on an analysis of resilience and vulnerability factors, the research tested three hypotheses, as outlined in Table 1 . Eight FGDs and a quantitative survey were conducted with youth aged 14-17 who took part in programming in 2017 (and were aged 14-16 at the time of their participation in NGO-led activities). Young Lebanese and Syrians of both genders were included, and focus groups were divided by nationality and gender.
Research participants were divided into a treatment group and a control group (see Table 2 ). The treatment group was made up of youths who participated in resilience-building programmes, which the implementing organisations understood as directly or indirectly linked to PVE. The control group was made up of youths of the same demographics who took part in other interventions, unrelated to PVE, specifically vocational education, computer literacy classes, and basic literacy and numeracy classes. Access to all research participants was facilitated by the organisations implementing the programmes. While the research methodology borrows from evaluation methodologies and all research participants were beneficiaries of youth projects, the study does not constitute an evaluation of any one programme or approach. 
Research limitations
Achieving the desired sample size was not possible, particularly for the control group, as attempts to reach additional organisations that have worked with youth were not successful. Organisations not working on PVE were less interested in the research and, as they were not involved in its design, were naturally less committed to providing support. The organisation that committed to supporting the research was not able to provide access to the planned number of respondents. This was mostly due to the specific age range selected for the research, as beneficiaries of vocational training and other job-creation programmes tend to be older and participants in child-protection interventions tend to be younger. Although the research was planned for Tripoli, due to challenges with reaching the planned number of research participants, the area was expanded to include participants from the neighbouring areas of Beddawi and Wadi Nahleh. Analysis of the results based on location, however, was not possible, as the tools did not include questions on place of residence.
Organising logistics and managing FGDs was challenging. The challenges included large numbers of participants cancelling at the last minute, staff of local organisations not always being present to welcome and organise participants, FGDs not starting on time causing those who were punctual to get bored waiting, and discussions being interrupted by late arrivals or early departures.
Male youths were suspicious of research activities in general and felt they were being targeted or asked about sensitive issues. This was not strictly in relation to the topic of violence, 15 but did demonstrate that overall young people are wary of interventions and are concerned that research could be a way of gathering information that is used against them rather than to support them.
While the research sought to compare experiences of Lebanese and Syrian youth, many of the Syrian participants were born in Lebanon or grew up in Lebanon, and some had Lebanese mothers. An eighth of the Syrian survey participants were born in Lebanon and around half of the FGD participants had lived in Lebanon the majority of their lives. This decreased the importance of comparing results based on nationality, as the experiences of some Syrian youth were very similar to the Lebanese.
The separation between the control and treatment groups was not always as well defined or delineated as intended. Some control group FGD participants for example indicated that they have taken part in activities with organisations other than those participating in the research which covered topics that are normally covered in PVE programmes like life skills training. In some other cases FGD participants could not recall the content or learning from all activities due to the time passed. Given the concentration of programming in Tripoli, finding control participants who have participated in a single type of activity was challenging. This could also be indicative 15 One FGD participant talked about a previous FGD that was being recorded, in which he was asked sensitive questions in relation to the use of drugs, after which he chose to leave. In another FGD -when the discussion moved to the use of violence -young people again asked for the recording to be stopped.
of implementers targeting the same individuals based on similar and broad vulnerability criteria, and the perennial challenge of working with "the same faces" and not accessing hard-to-reach young people.
The survey questionnaire was tested, and some questions and answers were adapted. However, as some questions were not adequately edited, this left them open to various interpretations. Furthermore, some questions had a large number of possible answers, which resulted in a spread of the answers, and, given the small sample size, limited the ability to cross tabulate these answers with other variables given the 8% margin of error.
The small sample size made it difficult to make statistically relevant comparisons. Therefore, only differences of 10% and more were considered in the analysis. As such, the quantitative results should be read as indicative of youth attitudes, but they are only representative of the youths who participated in the selected programmes.
It thus might not be accurate based on the results of the quantitative side of the study to make generalisations about youth participating in PVE programmes more broadly, but results remain useful in describing general trends.
Findings
Context
Tripoli, the second-largest city in Lebanon, is home to around half a million inhabitants, and hosts an additional 70,000 Syrian refugees and around 30,000 registered Palestinian refugees living in one camp and five gatherings. 16 The city has been "left out of any political, social, or economic development priorities" 17 and was the scene of multiple rounds of violent clashes that led to lasting perceptions among non-Tripolitans that the city is a hub 
Psycho-social resilience
In terms of personal resilience, young people seem to be generally well supported and show high resilience. The majority (71%) of those surveyed reported going to a parent or an older sibling for help, and only 2% said they have nobody to go to, with no significant difference observed between the treatment and control groups. Mothers were the number-one support providers for both male and female participants, although more male youth were found to ask their fathers for help (25% versus 9%), or resort to a friend of the same age (11% versus 6%). (See Agree/strongly agree with the below statements 3.2.2 Self-confidence and sense of purpose FGD participants in the treatment group elaborated on the value of the programmes they took part in and the details of what these programmes covered. Primarily, they stated these had a positive impact on their confidence and ability to speak up. Others highlighted the acceptance of others, particularly from different areas, nationalities and confessions -especially between Sunnis and Alawites. One Syrian male participant explained that he learned "how to protect oneself, how to communicate with others, and how to have peace in one's heart and in relationships with others".
Survey results confirm that PVE programmes have more of a positive impact on related resilience indicators, particularly those around sense of purpose and personal empowerment. Education enrolment does correlate with a higher sense of purpose among youth; however, the correlation is stronger with participation in PVE programming (see Figure 4) . While respondents who are enrolled in education are 9% more likely to have a strong sense of purpose, participants in PVE programmes are 37% more likely to have a strong sense of purpose compared to participants in non-PVE programmes. participants focused on three main aspects when describing their communities, namely, social relations, the environment and security. Participants were asked to discuss their community, and to describe aspects in it that they liked or disliked. Several spoke of communal solidarity in times of trouble as the key positive factor; however, many -particularly females -described tensions between neighbours mostly on issues related to cleanliness and use of space. Female participants spent more time at home and focused on domestic relationships and relationships in the neighbourhood, expressing discomfort with cafés that were often the source of harassment and where fights started. They also complained of social restrictions, mostly due to gossip that leads to families further restricting their daughters' movements. Male participants often spoke of public and hangout spaces, including cafés, and sports and gaming places, as the favoured parts of the community where they meet friends.
In terms of the environment, piles of garbage and noise were common concerns for young people, often cited as evidence of recklessness of residents as well as neglect by the authorities. Participants expressed particular appreciation and pride in public gardens or historical sites if these were close to their homes.
Insecurity was a major concern for most of the youth, although this differed from neighbourhood to neighbourhood.
Several areas were named as problematic, 21 with residents of neighbouring areas saying things like: "I like nothing in my neighbourhood" and "the situation is such that I don't want to even leave the house, I feel I run the risk of getting a bullet in my head if I go out". Although youth spoke of a calm and supportive home environment, the reality of their violent neighbourhood affects school life, public life and relations between neighbours in ways that are beyond their control. Almost all FGD participants could easily recount violent incidents taking place in their neighbourhood in the previous week, including armed clashes that they had witnessed. Several reported carrying knives and two male participants reported using a knife in a fight. Whether or not they condoned violence, most male participants explained that being able to navigate the violent landscape in which they live is a necessary skill,
21
This includes Bab al-Tabbaneh, Qobbe and al-Masaken, to name a few.
Control group Treatment group All respondents
Youth who disagree/ strongly disagree Youth enrolled in education who disagree/strongly disagree and that shying away from the use of violence or the inability to respond to it would result in their being labelled as cowards and being bullied. Although the FGD guide did not introduce this line of questioning, several youths spoke of the wide use of drugs. While this is not necessarily a sign that youth use drugs, several young people were aware how much certain drugs cost, commented on drug abuse habits of people they know, or gave examples of fights that escalated due to one involved party being on drugs.
Indicators on sense of belonging and participation were less positive than those on psycho-social resilience, but also showed some positive impact of PVE programming, particularly around having friends and feeling close to people in their neighbourhood (see Figure 5) . Staff of organisations implementing PVE programmes explained that taking part in group activities not only introduces people to new friends, but also helps to build social skills around how to make friends, how to approach people, how to be sensitive and caring, and the common concerns and dreams of peers. This is a desired outcome of most youth programmes, particularly ones that have a life skills component. The municipality is usually interested in helping
Relationships with and trust in state institutions
Survey results generally show little or no difference between treatment and control groups in terms of relationships with the state and state security institutions (see Figure 6 ). It is therefore not possible to correlate participation in PVE programmes with more positive perceptions of security actors.
Understandably, Syrian respondents were less comfortable than the Lebanese in seeking out security actors, with 41% of Syrians indicating that they are comfortable or very comfortable going to the police compared to 61% of the Lebanese.
Figure 6: Percentage of youths that feels comfortable seeking out security institutions
The FGDs revealed contradictory attitudes relating to young people's relationships with the army and police.
While some youths expressed feeling comfortable when the army and police are stationed close to their place of residence or work and expressed frustration that their areas are neglected by security forces, several said they did not trust the army, citing examples of biased treatment, and its presence negatively affecting the image of their neighbourhood. Some described the security forces as inefficient, joking that, if they were to call the police or army when there was a fight, it would arrive long after the fight was over and the parties had reconciled.
Some respondents also talked about the commonality of shooting during election periods and the police never interfering due to the shooters being protected by the candidates. Others expressed a more problematic relationship with the state, not only in the de facto control of certain politicians, but also in relation to their neighbourhood in
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Army point
General security
Police particular. One youth, for example, said that the "state only enters our neighbourhood on a tank", rhetorically asking if the "state has the right to just shoot" the way it had in previous incidents in the area. The comment was particularly potent indicating resentment of the securitised attitude towards the areas in which they live. This securitisation, alongside many complaints in the same FGD relating to the quality and management of the public school and repeated crackdowns on drug use among youth, was described in contrast to the long-time neglect of the area by state institutions.
PVE programmes were found to have a clear correlation with attitudes towards the municipality, with almost double the respondents from the treatment group (60%) believing that the municipality is interested in helping them as compared to the control group (31%). Municipalities, particularly the one in Tripoli, were involved in the youth programmes implemented, either by hosting, attending or facilitating sports competitions. This resulted in more youth recognising the involvement of the municipality, leading to a better outlook on its work and intentions.
Overall, beneficiaries of PVE programmes in Tripoli demonstrated higher personal resilience in terms of a sense of purpose, sense of belonging and trust in the municipality than beneficiaries of non-PVE programmes. Regarding other aspects of personal resilience, such as the ability to set goals, solve problems and seek support, youths who participated in both PVE programmes and non-PVE programmes were found to have similarly high indicators of resilience. Youth attitudes towards security forces were found to be contradictory, expressing feelings of comfort when the army and/or police is stationed close by, alongside feelings of mistrust and accusations of biased treatment. Survey results generally showed little or no difference between treatment and control groups in terms of youths' relationship with the state and state security institutions, with the exception of the significantly higher confidence in the municipality's interest to help youth among PVE programme beneficiaries.
Resilience and vulnerability
Hypothesis 2: Higher personal resilience correlates with more nuanced perception, experience and response to key vulnerabilities.
Research participants were found to experience all vulnerabilities identified in the methodology (see Box 2). The lack of learning opportunities was associated with a poor quality of education and use of violence at school. 
Degradation of education infrastructure and opportunities to learn
Of 143 respondents, 43 (30%) were out of school (see Figure 7 ). While this is understandable given that the control group was chosen from participants in vocational training activities, the percentage of out-of-school youth was still high even from the treatment group (22%). During FGDs, participants explained that, after years of repeating their classes, they eventually quit after failing, indicating that the level of education they attained was much lower than that indicative of their age. While school dropout is sometimes linked to youth from poor families needing to work and supplement the income of their family, only 25% of out-of-school youth reported working full time.
Rather than pull factors in the marketplace, FGD participants linked school dropout almost predominantly to push factors in the school, including poor quality of education, unfair and humiliating treatment, excessive use of violence, and, in some cases, school interruption due to the security situation in Lebanon or Syria. Participants complained of the lack of commitment and limited supervision of teachers whom they described as only being interested in "receiving their salary at the end of the month". They spoke of a lack of academic support and frequent experiences of being ridiculed for poor performance. They described the school environment as violent, particularly for boys, where corporal punishment was widely used by teachers and where students -and in some cases their parents -also often reacted violently to teachers, administrators and other students.
Although this was the case among both Syrian and Lebanese youth, Syrian youth more frequently cited the disinterest of teachers, poor curriculum and experiences of humiliation. Girls, both Syrian and Lebanese, complained of harassment outside the school and, in one case, the enforcement of a conservative veil at a private school. 
Future aspirations and ability to achieve them
Responses around future plans and aspirations, and ability to achieve them, varied between FGD participants according to gender and nationality. Lebanese male youth expressed feelings of a lack of prospects. They said that they either wished to immigrate so they can live "in dignity" and "have some worth", or alternatively, they wished that there would be work opportunities in Lebanon. They explained how unemployment and poverty were rampant, seeing this as evidence of state negligence. Syrian males predominantly wanted to travel, mostly back to Syria where they would have, according to them, the opportunity to start businesses. As one respondent expressed: "one's dream can only be realised in their country". Some Syrian and Lebanese male youths, despite a desire to travel, expressed concern over how they would be perceived and treated as "Muslims" abroad.
Girls on the other hand, both Syrian and Lebanese, were more positive. The majority discussed plans of gaining a specific degree or profession, such as becoming a teacher, accountant or starting a beauty salon. Some wanted jobs with the police or army, although all agreed for the need for wasta. 22 A few expressed more ambitious aspirations like travelling to "see the world", starting a charity to take care of orphans or "becom[ing] successful and famous".
When asked what job they would like to do in the future, respondents cited specific professions, mostly realistic ones that they have been trained to do or are doing already, such as working in a sweet shop, as a car mechanic, a civil or military servant, or a hairdresser. This largely explains why, when youths were asked if they think they will be able to achieve their aspirations, less than 20% said that they would not be able to do so. 
Control group Treatment group
All respondents
Family members were found to be the preferred role models (see Figure 9 ). Parents were praised for their kindness, tolerance, integrity and ethics, followed by public figures who were largely admired for their success and fame.
There were significant differences when comparing by nationality. Lebanese youth predominantly chose their parents as role models and only one Lebanese female youth chose a teacher or supervisor. Syrian youth had a wider spectrum of role models including teachers and employers, which included mostly NGO staff and teachers in private schools. Notably, 38% of all respondents said they had no role model. In the FGDs this was explained by wanting to be their "own selves", that they did not want to resemble others; however, for many others it was more to do with a lack of inspiring individuals around them. Whether there is a correlation between lower resilience and lack of role models is inconclusive.
A significant proportion of youths chose cousins as role models due to their educational achievements. Such role models represented attainable aspirations, given that those who have achieved them came from a similar context. It also demonstrates the role of wider family networks in building resilience. 
Views on marginalisation and injustice
Most youths described their areas as being in a worse condition than other parts of the country, only faring better than areas of Tripoli seen as more disadvantaged or insecure. Some compared their neighbourhood to other areas of Tripoli that are calmer or more affluent, while others compared it to the whole of Tripoli, to the country's capital Beirut, or to nearby "Christian" areas like Zgharta, Koura and Batroun. In describing her neighbourhood, one FGD participant said: "It is full of garbage, the streets are full of holes and are not properly paved...go to a Christian area and compare, it feels like you have been to another country."
One participant attributed the city's troubles to its residents failing to take care of it or keep it clean. Another blamed uninterested politicians who did not speak up on behalf of their constituency. As one female FGD participant explained: "the voices of Christians are better heard, they have parliamentarians who raise [issues]". A third perspective framed the condition of their neighbourhood as structural discrimination against Muslims, with an FGD participant claiming that Christians needed lower qualifications than Muslims to join the army.
Similar views on injustice were found among treatment and control groups, showing that PVE programming has little impact in this regard (see Figure 10 ). Injustice was felt by at least 50% of the respondents on most issues (including the perception that one's confession was the most vulnerable, that politicians neglect one's neighbourhood, or that discipline at home was suffocating). Unemployment was the one issue on which there was consensus, with 90% of survey respondents indicating that many people in their neighbourhood are struggling to find a job. Nevertheless, in FGDs, participants did not focus on this, which can possibly be explained by their age -while they recognize this as a key issue in their community from experiences of parents, older siblings and others, they have not yet been affected by this personally.
Treatment by the police and prisoners in Roumieh came up during two FGDs, many describing the detentions -be it on drug or "terrorism" charges -as unfair. One female participant spoke of a friend's father who was imprisoned before the start of the Syrian crisis for 10 years, only to be found not guilty. Others claimed that the state targets them, imprisoning many young men in their area, some of whom have confessed guilt, but many others who have done nothing wrong, and even some who were under 18 at the time.
A higher percentage of Lebanese youths as compared to Syrian youths perceived their neighbourhood and community as being marginalised. For example, 71% of the Lebanese believed their neighbourhood is not taken care of by politicians and does not receive any services compared to 56% of Syrians. In addition, 69% of the Lebanese believe their sect and its members are the most vulnerable and victimised compared to 51% of Syrians.
The marginalisation of Syrian youths was perceived as being linked to their nationality. One Syrian male participant, for example, expressed that:
"In one's own country it is different. You wouldn't leave your house to find a thug threatening you with a knife or stealing your money, you would know the place better. Take a Lebanese person, for example. If he is faced with a problem, he reaches out to the Lebanese Army and they resolve it for him, but when a Syrian is
involved, the army does not interfere." 
Ability to fight injustice and challenge marginalisation
A difference between the control and treatment groups was observed in relation to the ability to fight injustice and challenge marginalisation: 71% in the control group believed there is nothing they can do to fight the injustice they are suffering compared to only 50% in the treatment group (see Figure 11 ). This is consistent with the empowering impact of PVE programming noted generally, with other variables, such as enrolment in education, appearing to have little impact on that perception. A slightly larger percentage of females (62%) compared to males (55%) tended to agree that there is nothing one can do to fight injustice. The empowering impact of participation in PVE programmes on the ability to fight injustice, as the section below indicates, increases young people's inclination to use violence to counter injustice. 
Correlation between resilience and vulnerability
In general, no major correlation was observed between higher resilience and more nuanced outlooks on vulnerability. The only resilience factors that correlated with one's ability to fight injustice are sense of purpose, ability to express emotions, and ability to accept people from other confessions and nationalities. There was no observable correlation between vulnerability and other resilience factors, including problem solving and goal setting, which are skills developed through life skills training programmes, and a greater sense of belonging (e.g. feeling close to people in your neighbourhood), which do not appear to correlate with one's belief that injustice can be confronted.
In terms of existing correlations, a weaker sense of purpose correlates with higher vulnerability. Those who believe that little of what they do has value were more likely to believe that there is nothing they can do to fight injustice (76% compared to 58% of all respondents). They were also more likely to believe that the only way to fight injustice is through the use of violence (45% compared to 25%). (See Figure 12.) A second correlation was observed in relation to the ability to express emotions: 68% of those who cited difficulty in expressing emotions believed that there is nothing they can do to fight injustice, compared to 58% of all participants.
The third and most evident correlation was in relation to the ability to make friends with people of other nationalities or confessions. Those who believed that it was difficult to make friends with either group tended to have a stronger perception of being discriminated against, and expressed a greater inability to fight injustice and more prevalent perception of violence being the only way to fight injustice. (See Figure 13 .) This correlation does not mean that there is necessarily a causal relationship between acceptance of others and the ability to fight injustice. FGDs
Control group Treatment group All respondents
Impossible to counter injustice without violence I feel like there is nothing I can do to fight the injustice I am suffering from indicate that it is possibly the greater sense of injustice that causes some youth to not want to interact with people from other confessions and nationalities. Youths in some neighbourhoods indicated that they are often singled out as trouble-makers by the authorities and by other communities, making it harder for them to venture beyond their narrow community.
Figure 12: Youths' views on fighting injustice
Agree/strongly agree with the below statements It was found overall that higher personal resilience does not directly correlate with a more nuanced perception, experience and response to key vulnerabilities related to violent extremism. While a stronger sense of purpose has a positive correlation with the belief that one can fight injustice, other aspects of resilience, such as the ability to problem solve or a strong sense of belonging, were not found to lead to being empowered to fight injustice. Overall, marginalisation and lack of prospects were perceived similarly by beneficiaries of PVE and non-PVE programmes, indicating that PVE interventions targeting youth do not impact either the structural causes of violent extremism or the ways these are seen by beneficiaries. Most youths described their areas as being in a worse condition than other parts of the country, mostly blaming this on neglect by politicians and highlighting the poor quality of education, including excessive use of violence in schools, as well as limited employment opportunities as the key problem areas.
All respondents
Those who agreed/strongly agreed with the statement: "Little of what I do has value"
There is nothing I can do to fight injustice
The only way to fight injustice is through the use of violence Support for violence was measured through scenario-based questions exploring when it is acceptable to use physical violence. Supporting armed groups was mostly measured qualitatively, as survey questions referring to specific political actors or groups were found to be too sensitive by the organisations supporting the research.
Everyday fighting and use of violence
Youths in FGDs showed a nuanced understanding of violence and its use. They elaborated on why young people resort to violence, which included "showing off", "demonstrating masculinity", "defending themselves, friends Other reasons were also given. One Lebanese youth explained that he carries a knife with him as he finishes work late and has to walk through neighbourhoods he perceives as unsafe: "in this country, you need to carry something to defend yourself". Another described using a knife in a fight to defend his cousin who was targeted by the brother of a girl he was talking to. He felt so shaken and disturbed by the incident, however, he told his father what happened and went to apologise to the family of the young man he injured. The explanation of "defence" parallels youths' descriptions of the context in which they live, where violence is widely used in day-to-day interactions and where responding violently is necessary. Male FGD participants almost unanimously agreed that, if they did not stand their ground, they would be subject to repeated harassments and be branded as cowards. FGDs further highlighted the difference between "joining an armed group" and "carrying arms". Participants named various local leaders who perform strong-arm racketeering and engage in violent activities on behalf of a political figure, and support him during election periods, and who have a following or a group of members most of whom are armed and perform services on the local leader's behalf. Some older youth in the neighbourhoods work for such local leaders -including, for example, the brother of one of the female FGD participants. Such employment was seen as a "security job" and did not necessarily have ideological or political motivations, but rather clientelistic attachments to a leader who both controls and provides support to the area where young people live. These comments correlate with findings that male youth were more likely to explain the joining of an armed group with the need to make money (29%, more than double the percentage of female respondents). Followers of various groups sometimes clashed, most recently during the election period.
Young people's opinion of joining such groups varied, and again showed an intricate understanding of local dynamics. The key motivating factors are the stamina of the leader and financial benefits, although some believe that fighters are manipulated by politicians who use them in their political feuds. For some -and mostly depending on the neighbourhood -such local leaders provided services to the community and supported its residents financially, particularly in times of crisis, as in the case of an urgent medical need or if they were in trouble with the authorities. One local leader was described as a Robin Hood figure who "takes from the rich and gives to the poor", and several youth saw him as a role model, "because all people like him" and because "he is there for people in need". They acknowledged he commits racketeering but excused it as it was not against the people of his own neighbourhood, and even asserted that the "state" is with him given that he has support of some politicians.
In other cases, youth excused the local followers of such networks, echoing sympathetic statements like "what else can he do, he needs to feed his children", but did not excuse the leader. Particularly in relation to Bab alTabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen, money was seen as the main motivator for joining an armed group.
In a similar vein, participants explained why people joined groups fighting in Syria. Participants said their neighbourhoods were poor and that US$200 was enough to persuade some people. Others explained that some went because they believed it was the right thing to do due to their "faith". The latter also explains why some women went, as it was either with their husbands or to marry men there. Participants also complained that, since the start of the crisis in Syria, their community has been a target of
Lebanese security operations and continuously raided not only on terrorism-related charges but also on drugrelated ones, with arrests often unjustified.
Attitudes towards the use of violence
Less than 50% of the youth surveyed believed that it is okay to hit someone who hits you first, and even less believe that the only way to defend one's community is through the use of force, further confirming that their own opinions around violence do not correspond with their assessment that they need to use violence. (See Figure 16 .) The gender and nationality differences here are notable, with considerably more male (60%) than female (35%) youth believing that it is okay to hit someone who hits you first and more Lebanese (56%) than Syrians (43%) believing this.
Figure 16: Youths' views on the use of violence
It is also notable that participation in PVE programming seems to result in a more favourable attitude towards violence, with 13% more participants in PVE programmes than those in the control group choosing to "beat" somebody if they make them angry, and 20% more in the former group believing that it is okay to hit someone who hits you first and that the only way to defend one's community and family is through the use of force.
Given the widespread use of violence, some of these beliefs could be the result of young people becoming empowered through PVE programme activities, rather than due to the "acceptance of violence" per se. Given that the inability to face violence was described as a sign of weakness, it is possible that youth who have been through an empowering experience might be more willing to respond to perceived injustice, as evident from the much lower percentage of treatment group (8%) compared to control group (27%) participants who choose to "do nothing" in a situation where someone makes them angry. (See Figure 17. ) Programme staff of one of the participating organisations indicated that youth participants of PVE programmes are encouraged to fight for their rights, refuse injustice, protect themselves against any impending harm, take care of themselves and value their lives. Participants in PVE programmes may therefore be led to believe that they should defend their rights in any way, even with violence, if that is what is needed. Such an attitude might also be influenced by sports coaches (an integral part of one of the PVE programmes selected for this research was sports training). Sports coaches -who were difficult to recruit and came from a physical education background and not a peacebuilding onesometimes encouraged self-defence, even if that meant using violence, and/or used violent coaching methods.
All respondents Female Male
It's okay to hit someone who hits you first
The only way to defend one's community and family is through the use of force Survey results showed no correlation between the majority of resilience and vulnerability indicators and attitudes towards the use of violence. Questions were asked around the ability to express one's own feelings; perception of parents' support; ability to problem solve and life satisfaction; as well as relations with state institutions; level of frustration with, and possible responses to, injustice; the ability to challenge marginalisation; and sense of belonging and productivity. Only two correlations were observed: a larger percentage of those who had difficulties making friends with people of other nationalities believed that it is okay to hit someone who hits you first (65% compared to 48% of all respondents) and that violence is the only way to defend one's community (58% compared to 39% of all respondents). (See Figure 18 .)
Control group Treatment group All respondents
Chose "I beat him/her" when asked "What do you do when someone makes you very angry?"
Chose "I do nothing" when asked "What do you do when someone makes you very angry?"
Agree/strongly agree with the statement: "It is okay to hit someone who hits you first"
Agree/strongly agree with the statement: "The only way to defend one's community and family is through the use of force" Figure 18 : Attitudes towards the use of violence among all respondents and those who believe making friends of other nationalities is difficult
Violence is an integral part of young people's lives and a necessary survival skill for "defending themselves, friends and family", "demonstrating masculinity" and "standing one's ground". No correlation was observed between higher resilience and a decreased support of violence and armed groups. One exception is the link between intercommunity trust and potential use of violence: youth who find it difficult to make friends with peers of other nationalities are more likely to express that the use of violence is acceptable. Participation in PVE programmes correlated with a stronger support of violence, which is likely to be due to the empowerment effect of the programmes and the absence of targeted activities to discourage the use of violence.
Joining an armed group was seen as different and described as a form of employment. Such employment was seen as a "security job" -mostly by male respondents -and did not necessarily have any ideological or political motivation, but rather clientelistic attachments to a leader who both controls and provides support to the area where young people live. This demonstrates that supporting armed groups is often the result of structural vulnerabilities, such as limited access to employment opportunities and services, and is mostly linked to local thugs with political backing rather than armed groups fighting in Syria.
All respondents
Agreed/strongly agreed that it is difficult to make friends with other nationalities Agree/strongly agree that it is okay to hit someone who hits you first Agree/strongly agree that violence is the only way to defend one's community
Conclusions
The research established that beneficiaries of PVE projects display a higher sense of purpose, belonging and trust in the municipality -elements identified in the conceptual framing as resilience factors contributing to PVE. In contrast, other aspects of personal resilience, such as the ability to set goals, problem solve or seek help when needed, were similar for beneficiaries of both PVE and non-PVE projects. This indicates the ability of educational programmes to build resilience through life skills training and their potential to address other resilience factors if they borrow from PVE resilience-building methodologies. Trust in the state, including security forces, is not higher among PVE project beneficiaries, although it is recognised as a significant resilience factor. The exception is trust in the municipality, which is visibly pronounced among PVE project beneficiaries, possibly due to the association between implementing organisations and local authorities. Another key finding is that participation in PVE programmes correlates with stronger relations with friends and people from one's neighbourhood, which are seen as indicators of a sense of belonging and relates to social cohesion approaches applied in PVE programming.
While PVE project beneficiaries appear to have higher resilience, this resilience does not correlate to a more nuanced experience or response to key identified vulnerabilities relating to violent extremism. Beneficiaries of PVE and non-PVE projects share very similar vulnerabilities, such as a lack of employment opportunities (90%) and disregard of one's neighbourhood by politicians (63%). The only resilience factor that PVE projects seem to influence and that correlates with the individual ability to fight injustice is sense of purpose. Overall, youth-focused PVE interventions do not seem to impact vulnerabilities to violent extremism.
Similarly, no correlation was observed between higher resilience and a decreased level of supporting violence and armed groups. The one positive correlation found was that youth who find it difficult to make friends
One of the city's narrow and overcrowded neighbourhoods, Tripoli, Lebanon © Ali Hamouch/International Alert with peers of other nationalities (a factor of weak resilience) are more likely to condone violence. Surprisingly, beneficiaries of PVE programmes demonstrated a more favourable attitude towards violence. While this could be a result of young people being empowered and refusing "to do nothing", it also indicates that youth-focused PVE projects are not successfully challenging prevalent attitudes that violence is an acceptable means for seeking justice. Beneficiaries of both PVE and non-PVE projects showed a nuanced understanding of violence and its use, but confirmed that violence is common in everyday life and is used to "defend oneself, friends and family", "demonstrate masculinity" and "stand one's ground" so as to not be labelled as cowards. Joining an armed group, however, was not associated with fighting injustice but rather seen as a "security job" and a clientelistic attachment to a leader who both controls and provides support to the area where young people live. More than anything, youth resilience, vulnerability and attitudes towards violence were influenced by the prevalent use of violence in their schools and neighbourhoods, compelling youth to use violence as an adaptation strategy, and highlighting the need for systemic interventions to create supportive school and family environments alongside building individual resilience.
The evidence that emerged from this research highlights that PVE programmes are successful in building some aspects of individual resilience that other youth programmes do not achieve. Alongside individual resilience, PVE programmes targeting youth need to strengthen key aspects of community resilience such as community cohesion and positive networks, and the ability to understand and deal with conflict non-violently. The increase in individual resilience in itself does not lead to a change in how key vulnerabilities are perceived, as these remain unaddressed, and does not affect attitudes to violence that prevail in the community. Parallel work on addressing vulnerabilities to violent extremism is needed to achieve effective prevention, including through increasing economic opportunities, improving the quality of education and strengthening the rule of law.
